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Abstract
Over the last ten years, argumentation has come to be increasingly central as a core study within Artificial Intelligence (AI). The
articles forming this volume reflect a variety of important trends, developments, and applications covering a range of current topics
relating to the theory and applications of argumentation. Our aims in this introduction are, firstly, to place these contributions in the
context of the historical foundations of argumentation in AI and, subsequently, to discuss a number of themes that have emerged
in recent years resulting in a significant broadening of the areas in which argumentation based methods are used. We begin by
presenting a brief overview of the issues of interest within the classical study of argumentation: in particular, its relationship—
in terms of both similarities and important differences—to traditional concepts of logical reasoning and mathematical proof. We
continue by outlining how a number of foundational contributions provided the basis for the formulation of argumentation models
and their promotion in AI related settings and then consider a number of new themes that have emerged in recent years, many of
which provide the principal topics of the research presented in this volume.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In its classical treatment within philosophy, the study of argumentation may, informally, be considered as concerned
with how assertions are proposed, discussed, and resolved in the context of issues upon which several diverging
opinions may be held. Thus philosophical investigations of argumentation, from Aristotle to the present day, have
addressed such themes as: the mechanisms by which “legitimate” argumentation in support of a claim may be dis-
tinguished from “flawed” argumentation; analyses of the typical structures that constitute argument components and
argumentation development; the processes by which participants engaging in debate may advance their respective
positions and undermine contrary stances and arguments, etc; and the contexts in which these questions are decided.
The importance of such philosophical theories to so-called everyday reasoning has a long and distinguished history
in AI, and contributions from contemporary philosophical analyses continue to play a major role in the evolution of
effective computational exploitation of argumentation technology.
Within the simplified overview of argumentation outlined in the preceding paragraph, one can, already, identify a
number of themes whose elements embody issues of a computational nature in the following:
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• Identifying rules and protocols describing argumentation processes.
• Distinguishing legitimate from invalid arguments.
• Determining conditions under which further discussion is redundant.
It is, of course, the case that similar issues underpin one well-established and highly-developed theory: that of formal
logic and mathematical proof. It is no coincidence that much of the formal computational treatment of argumentation
has its roots in ideas developed from AI inspired contributions to logic and deductive reasoning. So one finds in
mathematical proof theory core concepts such as: precisely defined means for expressing assertions (e.g. formulae
in a given logical language); accepted bases on which to build theorems (e.g. collections of axioms); procedures
prescribing the means by which further theorems may be derived from existing theorems and axioms (e.g. templates
for inference rules); and precise concepts of termination (e.g. a sentential form is derivable as a theorem, “true”; or is
logically invalid, “false”).
While the structural elements presented in this view of mathematical reasoning have proven to be a useful basis in
the development of argumentation-based models in AI, the formal apparatus and methods of mathematical reasoning
are, ultimately, radically different in nature to those of importance when considering the concept of argumentation
as it is familiar from everyday contexts, e.g. as it might occur in political debate, the discussion of ethical principles,
deliberation in judicial settings, etc. While there are, of course, parallels that can be made,—e.g. that those engaged
in debate have some collection of accepted premises on which there is agreement, possibly, even, some recognition of
when contributions to a discussion are “unreasonable” or flawed, etc.—there are, however, a number of fundamental
distinctions between the concepts “P is a formal proof that T holds” and “P is a persuasive argument for accepting T ”.
Thus, in mathematical reasoning,
(a) The premises can, ultimately, be explicitly defined in terms of closed concepts, e.g. the axioms of Euclidean
geometry, the Zermelo–Frankel basis for set theory (ZF). Furthermore classical mathematical reasoning is based
on an assumption that such premises are, collectively, consistent.1
(b) Reasoning and analysis takes place within a closed, tightly defined context, i.e. there is no notion of “incomplete”
or “uncertain” information.
(c) Conclusions are final and definite: if P is a correct proof that T , then T is, ipso facto valid and this status does
not admit subsequent qualification or amendment, let alone retraction.
(d) Reasoning and conclusions are entirely objective, not susceptible to rational dispute on the basis of subjective
views and prejudices.2 Proof is demonstration whereas argument is persuasion.
In argument and discussion as encountered in everyday contexts, it is rare that any, let alone all, of these apply:
the premises upon which debates may build are often presupposed as forming part of the background assumptions
common to all parties involved; the information and knowledge brought to bear in the course of discussion will
often be incomplete, vague, or uncertain. The remaining two aspects, in many ways, highlight the most significant
differences between “logical proof” and “persuasive argument”. Arguments are defeasible: the reasoning that formed
a persuasive case for T , in the light of changes in viewpoint or awareness of information not previously available, may
subsequently fail to convince. This defeasibility is never removed: an argument may cease to be challenged and so
accepted, but the possibility of challenge remains. Finally, the extent to which an argued case is accepted is subjective,
dependent on the views, attitudes, and prejudices of the audiences to which it is directed. The same case may convince
some people but, equally, fail to convince others.
1 We note that in a number of systems, consistency cannot be formally proven, cf. [95] and so, in such cases, consistency is, indeed, an assumption.
2 Some clarification of this claim may be in order. Suppose  is a derivation of ϕ within a theory 〈A,R〉 (with axioms A and inference rules R).
Within the same theory, the proof  admits no rational, objective basis for dispute: criticisms that “ϕ is ‘inconvenient’ or ‘counter-intuitive’ ” are
subjective, and entirely irrelevant to the status of ϕ within the theory 〈A,R〉. In order to give rational grounds for not accepting ϕ it is necessary to
endorse an alternative theory within which ϕ cannot be derived. As a concrete example, consider the axiomatic basis ZF extended by the so-called
“Axiom of Choice” (ZF + AC): although widely adopted in modern theory this conflicts with Intuitionist principles which disqualify AC as an axiom
so that theorems dependent on AC are (rationally) not accepted by Intuitionists.
T.J.M. Bench-Capon, P.E. Dunne / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 619–641 621One can summarise the distinction between argumentation and proof by the observation that the object of argu-
mentation is to persuade (to acceptance of a given claim; to performance of a desired action, and so on). Unlike the
concept of “proof”—at the level of deriving a sentential representation of an assertion—whether an argument is “cor-
rect” is not a factor, and, indeed, “correctness” may not even be sensibly defined. In contrast, mathematical reasoning,
in order to have any value, must be correct where “correctness” has a strict, formal definition: beyond this requirement,
however, notions of “persuasiveness” are unimportant.
In summary, the importation of elements from logic and formal deductive reasoning has provided a powerful basis
for modelling and analysing argumentation in computational settings of AI. As we shall discuss later, these continue
to form an important strand of contemporary work. It is also the case, however, that a number of significant direc-
tions pursued in recent years, have broadened the scope and concerns of argumentation in AI beyond this earlier
logic driven motivation. As a consequence, one has a shift of emphasis within the developed treatment of argumen-
tation in AI progressing from formalisms rooted in classical deductive reasoning through models handling concepts
of incomplete information and uncertainty, to precise semantics for capturing defeasibility, and, within recent work,
propounding computational bases to account for subjective aspects of argumentation, often using the notion of “au-
dience” introduced by Perelman [145]. One consequence of such analyses has been the growth of work dealing with
computational procedures and issues of resource-boundedness in implementing these, e.g. as discussed in Loui [118].
All of these features make argumentation particularly attractive to applications requiring distributed intelligence, au-
tonomous components and synchronous interaction.
To conclude this overview, it is worth noting one further historical and continuing tradition. In common with
many established areas of AI, the computational theory of argumentation has benefited from contributions and ideas
originating in many diverse disciplines, so that a number of fundamental themes draw on the earlier work of, for
example, philosophers, logicians, and legal theorists. In presenting concrete realisations of these theories, work on
argumentation in AI has in its turn informed further research in these fields. Argumentation is thus an excellent
example of interdisciplinary interchange and the mutual benefits that can stem from this.
2. Foundations of argumentation in AI
A discussion of early influences on the development of argumentation models in AI may be found in the compre-
hensive survey of Chesnevar, Maguitman, and Loui [57], so we will be content merely to outline a few significant
aspects, referring the reader to [57] for a more detailed exposition. We concentrate on three important influential
themes,
2.1 Origins in non-classical logic.
2.2 Models of argumentation as dialogue process.
2.3 Diagrammatic views of argument structure.
2.1. Influence of non-classical logics on argumentation in AI
Early studies using argumentation inspired methods in AI contexts can be found in the work of Birnbaum, Flowers,
and McGuire, [42] in which a structural model of argument embracing notions of support and attack within a graph-
theoretic base comprising propositional forms, is applied to textual reasoning; and Alvarado and Dyer’s approaches,
[4,5], to the analysis of editorial presentation.
Undoubtedly, the important early motivations that brought argumentation theory into use in AI arose from the
issues of reasoning and explanation in the presence of incomplete and uncertain information. The failings of classical
propositional logic as a means to address these had been delineated in the influential work of Reiter [165], and, a
pressing concern of work throughout most of the 1980s and early 1990s was to build on the proliferation of treatments
of non-monotonic logics within AI. This state is succinctly summarised by [57, pp. 337–338].
Within AI, several non-monotonic reasoning formalisms emerged . . . In these formalisms, conclusions drawn may
be later withdrawn when additional information is obtained. Formal logics of argument emerged as one style of
formalising non-monotonic reasoning. The literature on non-monotonic reasoning dominated AI’s journals in the
mid 1980s.
622 T.J.M. Bench-Capon, P.E. Dunne / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 619–641Thus argumentation was initially adopted as a possible supporting approach with which to effect a formal treatment
of non-monotonic reasoning, rather than as a paradigm whose study might be of independent interest in itself. The
engagement of philosophers and legal theorists with reasoning and argumentation in AI marked a key stage in the
move towards computationally grounded models of argument. Particularly notable is the impact of Pollock’s work
on defeasible reasoning and justification: originally promoted in specialist philosophical literature, e.g. [146–148] its
relevance and significance to AI was recognised following Pollock’s dissemination of these ideas in [149–151].
In parallel with this development of the formal logical theory—in which context the significance of argumentation
techniques with respect to non-classical logic was further emphasised in the contributions of Simari and Loui [173]
and Brewka [44] (ideas in the latter being subsequently developed in [45])—the early 1990s saw important uses of
argumentation techniques in the computational treatment of legal reasoning: notably in Rissland and Ashley’s treat-
ment of legal argumentation from Case Law, [14,167,174] and its later extension by Aleven [3]; Prakken’s analyses in
[152]; Sartor’s models of legal reasoning as described in [169,170]; the use of argumentation techniques in explaining
complex legislation from Bench-Capon, Coenen, and Orton [29], etc.
The technical treatment evident in AI contributions to non-monotonic logics and the argumentation-based method-
ologies offered in the field of legal reasoning found some degree of common ground in the exploitation of logic
programming paradigms and knowledge-based systems. It was in this context, building on argument-based treatments
of “negation-as-failure” of Kakas, Kowalski, and Toni [108], together with Eshghi and Kowalski’s work on abductive
interpretation [89], that the watershed contribution of Dung [72,73] appeared: the model of argumentation described
in [73] is now recognised as providing an important bridge between argumentation theory as a supporting analytic
tool for non-monotonic reasoning and the independent exploitation of argumentation models in wider AI contexts.
Two important ideas are put forward and expanded in [73]:
(A) The reduction of argumentation about a given issue to a completely abstract setting consisting of a set of “atomic”
arguments, X , and a binary relation over these, A ⊆ X × X , with 〈x, y〉 ∈ A interpreted as “the argument x
attacks the argument y”.
(B) The proposal that intuitive notions of “collection of justified arguments” can be formally described by that of
extension-based semantics: that is, through various properties of subsets, S of X within an argumentation frame-
work (AF), 〈X ,A〉.3
The effect of (A) is that neither the structure of an argument nor the nature and semantics underpinning “x attacks y”
need explicit consideration within the abstract framework. Thus an “argument”, x, may be a simple atomic proposition,
p; or a (defeasible) rule, e.g. p ← q ∧ r ; or an instantiation of a richer, more particular, perhaps even domain specific,
argument scheme. That x attacks y may be on account of reasons varying in form from “x promotes a claim logically
equivalent to the negation of that promoted by y”, e.g. x : p and y : ¬ p; or “x promotes a claim incompatible
with the premises supporting the claim in y”, e.g. x : ¬p and y : q ← p ∧ r , and so on to the extent that “attacks”
disputing the applicability of a given inference scheme and more complex structures are represented entirely abstractly
in a single binary relation.
Dung’s introduction of various extension-based semantics has, as we shall discuss in Section 3.1, had a profound
influence on subsequent analyses of the concept of “collection of justified arguments”. In extremely informal terms, an
extension semantics, E , can be thought of as describing properties that a subset of arguments within a given framework
must satisfy in order to be deemed collectively justified, i.e. E : 〈X ,A〉 × 2X → {
,⊥}. Dung demonstrates how
different choices of E may be used to colour varying degrees of an argument’s “acceptability” ranging from very liberal
(so-called credulous) conditions through to extremely restrictive (so-called sceptical) requirements. The elements of
Dung’s original set-theoretic semantics are reviewed in a number of articles in this issue and for further technical
exposition we direct the reader to the article in this volume by Baroni and Giacomin [22].
The past 5–7 years have witnessed an intensive study of mechanisms with the common aim of developing Dung’s
ideas in various directions. For a detailed comparative critique of abstract argumentation techniques we refer the
reader to the valuable perspective provided by Vreeswijk [182].
3 The significance of this work is enhanced since approaches which include additional information, such as preferences, may do so in such a way
that the evaluation of argument status remains in terms of an underlying abstract framework.
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tween abstract argumentation and uniform treatment of non-classical logics. The Assumption-based frameworks (ABF)
of [43] consider deductive theories—〈L,R〉—(with L a formal language such as the language of well-formed propo-
sitional sentences, and R a (countable) set of inference rules) augmented by a triple 〈T ,Ab,−〉 in which T ⊆ L is a
set of beliefs, Ab ⊆ L a (non-empty) set of assumptions and −: Ab → L maps assumptions to their contrary in L.4
Such frameworks are shown to be applicable as a generic approach to describing a wide range of non-classical logics5
including: Reiter’s Default Logic [165], Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic [131], logic programming, and divers other
non-monotonic reasoning formalisms.
While ABF structures may on first inspection seem unrelated to the abstract argumentation frameworks of [73],
these can be presented as AFs by building the attack relation from the “contrary” mapping. A fuller overview of this
approach may be found in, e.g. the paper of Dung et al. in this volume [76, Section 2.2]. One feature of importance in
this abstraction of ABFs is that the resulting structure will typically describe an infinite graph. Informally, extension-
based semantics for ABFs are introduced as subsets of Ab whose union with the belief set T constitute a consistent
theory. Fuller technical descriptions may be found in [43, pp. 70–71]. Such links between abstract argumentation
frameworks and the deductive bases underpinning assumption-based schemes bring two powerful analytic approaches
to bear in algorithmic studies of extension-based semantics for argumentation: combinatorial and algorithmic graph
theory have been usefully applied in the former case; whereas technology developed for deductive reasoning and
formal logic has provided insight into the latter. We expand on such computational and algorithmic issues in Sec-
tion 3.1.
2.2. Argumentation and dialogue processes
The perspective of argumentation presented in Section 2.1 is strongly biased to a view wherein the overall aim of
argumentation is in deciding the status of some claim and in presenting a justification for it: thus, an assertion, p, is
established in the light of available information, but recognised as potentially defeated should new data emerge; the
nature of “justification” often being through some logical reasoning process. In total such a view treats argumentation
in support of a claim as a somewhat one-sided process in which a single party merely presents a reasoned justification.
In many applications such an abstraction is, of course, a natural analogue to use, e.g. in explanation-driven systems
such as [29], or in the context of decision-support processes.
An objection to such treatments, however, is that they fail to embrace the dialectical nature of argument, discourse,
and debate as encountered in everyday contexts: here argumentation is rarely a matter of a single party presenting a
case but is more commonly an informed exchange of ideas and positions involving several contributors: in other words,
argumentation concerning an issue, typically, arises as a dialogical process. Given this it is, perhaps, surprising that
significant computational exploitation of the established treatments of dialogue within philosophical, rhetorical, and
linguistic analyses, has been a comparatively recent phenomenon. Although originally explored to a limited extent
as a means of interacting with expert systems, the significant factor motivating contemporary computational use of
dialogue methods can be found in supporting multi-agent system applications, a topic that we review in Section 3.2.
In this section we review a number of foundational contributions and the preliminary AI motivated developments of
these.
As with the developments discussed in Section 2.1 many of the ideas within computational treatments of dialogue
build on contributions originating from philosophical analysis. One established concern of such study is the notion of
“fallacy”: a key aspect of which is the view that so-called “fallacious argument” encompasses a much wider collection
of issues than simply what may be (more accurately) termed “erroneous (mathematical or logical) reasoning”. Thus,
argument employing fallacious reasoning (in this wider philosophical and rhetorical sense) is not ipso facto “wrong”
nor easily dismissed merely by the action of highlighting occurrences of fallacy.6 It is the case, however—-and here
one finds a basis for the interaction between argumentation and dialogue processes—that particular fallacies occasion
4 Some treatments of ABFs omit explicit specification of a belief base T , e.g. [75,76].
5 Choosing 〈L,R〉 to be the language and standard inference structures of classical propositional logic, together with ϕ = ¬ϕ—that is the
contrary is simply logical negation—the resulting ABF structures recover standard propositional reasoning.
6 Although it is, of course, true that in regarding errors of logic as a form of fallacy, indicating such incidences could suffice as an attack on the
argument in whose support they are used.
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unreasonably justified through appeal to the opinion of an authority, is regarded in rhetorical theories of debate as fal-
lacious. The use of such support cannot be properly deemed invalid merely by signalling its occurrence. Such fallacies
are, however, open to attack by processes that invite further discussion. Thus the argument, “ϕ is the case since X has
stated as much” can be attacked in several ways, e.g. by disputing the authority of X in matters relating to the domain
of ϕ, by challenging the assertion that X has made any statement regarding ϕ, etc. We, thus, find two important themes
emerging: the classification of distinct types of fallacy; and the nature of possible attacking arguments. Categories of
fallacious reasoning have long been a topic of interest in rhetorical analysis and the treatment of Hamblin [100] has
had some influence on computational ideas. An important contribution to the second issue—the nature of attacks on
fallacious argument—is found in Walton’s formulation of Critical Question [186] which has been adopted in several
computational treatments of persuasive argument, e.g. [17,18,155,188]. An influential contribution in which a number
of key ideas that have played a significant role in computational realisations of dialogue machinery, also arose in mod-
elling and detecting one specific type of fallacious reasoning: MacKenzie’s dialogue game, DC, aimed at exposing
uses of petitio principii in argumentation, [121]. A striking feature of MacKenzie’s analysis,7 evident from [121, Ap-
pendix, pp. 129–132], is the wealth of computational ideas that are introduced and their expression in an operational
form. Thus, the concepts of commitment store, dialogue rules, locutions, etc. have all been adapted and extended
in current dialogue-based applications. Among the earliest argumentation-based presentations of MacKenzie’s ideas
beyond their use in recognising a specific class of fallacious reasoning, are those of Moore [130] and Bench-Capon,
Dunne, and Leng [31].
Analyses of fallacy in debate contexts had, typically, not differentiated the range of styles and aims to which
dialogue processes might be directed. This concept—that dialogues could be distinguished by their intentions—is ex-
panded in the seminal work of Walton and Krabbe [189]. The taxonomy of dialogue types in [189] is neither intended
to be nor presented as a definitive, complete catalogue of dialogue forms,8 but it has had considerable influence on
the treatment of dialogue in multi-agent systems. The central significance of [189] to later work on argumentation in
AI is in promoting an awareness that the purposes of dialogue encompass a number of different aims and, therefore,
the appropriate procedural mechanisms (for example, as might be defined from MacKenzie’s model) employed in
computational use have distinctive requirements, e.g. the operational specification of dialogue processes geared to ne-
gotiating agreements are unlikely to be best-suited to use in dialogues whose purpose is to elicit information. Dialogue
game approaches figure in several influential contributions dating from the mid-late 1990s: Gordon’s Pleadings Game,
[96]; Lodder’s study of legal justification (Dialaw) in [113]; and Loui’s use of dialectic approaches to non-monotonic
reasoning in which one of the first considerations of computational limits is presented [118]. A currently active area
in which these ideas have proven to be highly relevant is the exploitation of argumentation in multi-agent systems
applications.
We conclude this discussion of dialogue processes by reviewing one further aspect that has been fruitfully adapted
to argumentation in AI: analysing argument justifiability via dialogue games.
Interpretations of mathematical reasoning as a dialogue process have been advocated, from the early 1960s, in work
of Lorenz and Lorenzen [115–117]. An approach that has provided a useful abstraction within the more general context
of argumentation considers discussion over a disputed argument, p, as involving two participants conventionally
denoted PRO (who argues in favour of p) and OPP (who objects to p). A generic dialogue game building on Dung’s
argumentation model is presented in Jakobovits and Vermeir [105] (see also [104, Section IV]) and this approach
has been used as the basis of a number of later studies, e.g. [30,51,52,70,71]. This view of argument justification as
resolved by a dialogue implicitly underpins a number of formal ideas that have been adopted in algorithmic methods,
e.g. the concepts of argumentation lines and the generalisation of such as argumentation proof-trees. Analysis of the
properties of such structures has proven useful in examining a number of issues in argumentation and we discuss such
approaches further in Section 3.1.
7 It should be noted that [121] appeared almost 30 years ago in 1978.
8 Indeed, independently Dunne, Doutre, and Bench-Capon [85] and Walton, himself, in [187] have analysed one dialogue form not presented in
[189].
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In the presentation above we have made a distinction between the concepts of argument and argumentation: the
latter being understood as the processes by which given arguments are analysed and evaluated. An argument may,
informally, be considered as the basic supporting case behind a given assertion. Thus an argument, “for p”, in this
sense, may itself give rise to a variety of distinct structures ranging in complexity from simple statements of fact (“p
is an accepted fact”), through to deductive templates (e.g. “p follows from q and q is the case”) to even more intricate
structures (or argument schemes) that themselves may rely on further (sub)-arguments. A variety of argument schemes
have been proposed and studied, in work by legal theorists and philosophers, e.g. [145,186], however, the bulk of our
preceding review has largely addressed the issue of argumentation and its evolving application within AI with the
notion of “argument” itself only briefly discussed.
It has been seen that Dung’s fundamental model, as described in [73], abstracts away such internal structure from
individual arguments in order to focus on the manner in which arguments interact via the defined attack relationship.
In unfolding the exact nature of “the argument x attacks the argument y”, however, the reason why such an attack is
present needs to be considered in terms of those structural schema underlying the arguments x and y from which the
attack arises. Such an interpretation, therefore, raises issues that concern the form an argument might take, i.e. issues
regarding the components and representation of arguments rather than the process and outcome of the argumentation
involved.
Questions regarding argument form and uniform treatments of these have assumed increasing importance in recent
years, especially with respect to multi-agent exploitation of argumentation methods. A key aspect of this work has
been the extent to which diagrammatic models of argument structure have been adopted.
Early diagram-based models of argument were intended to aid in illustrative hand construction and analysis of
argument, with the resulting schemes being static depictions. An important example of such an approach is provided
by Wigmore diagrams [190], which although used as a method of describing legal arguments have only recently
been rediscovered and promoted in AI contexts, e.g. [41,164]. More widely known is the highly influential model of
argument promoted by Toulmin in the 1950s [178]. Toulmin’s structural interpretation treats an argument as consisting
of five sub-components: the Claim advanced (which could be qualified by a modal operator to describe concepts
such as “normally”); the (factual, evidential etc.) Data supporting this Claim; a Warrant providing a licence to infer
the Claim from the Data, together with Backing for this Warrant; and, to encapsulate exceptional cases, Rebuttal
conditions. Although—in common with Wigmore’s scheme—Toulmin diagrams were originally presented as a static
representation of the totality of an argument, they have proven a flexible approach in AI treatments of argumentation.
Thus, Bench-Capon et al. [32] describe a dynamically evolving extension of Toulmin’s schema and its use in a dialogue
game. Later work of Bench-Capon [26] develops the dialogue game of [32] providing a complete move repertoire and
operational semantics for it.
The exploitation of such argument diagram techniques offers an important basis for a number of contemporary ideas
among which are: argument visualisation methods, e.g. as might be used in decision support and explanation; argument
construction from source material; the specification of methods for interchanging arguments between distinct parties;
and in providing a unifying link between informal argument descriptions and formal abstract approaches such as [73].
Current work in these areas will be discussed in Section 3.4.
3. Recent trends and concerns
Section 2 has offered a, necessarily condensed, summary of influences on argumentation in AI covering up to
the start of the present century. As we turn now to more recent developments, that is subsequent to those contribu-
tions discussed in [57,182] a number of trends becomes apparent: the continuing enrichment of the formal theory
of argumentation building on [43,73,105]; the growth of argumentation-based methodologies in multi-agent systems
applications; new computational treatments of argument diagramming and visualisation; the exploitation of argumen-
tation in novel specialist domains; and the development of theoretical bases embracing subjectivity in argumentation
and concepts of practical reasoning.
Overall one finds in such themes a broadening of the scope of argumentation in AI beyond its earlier traditional
uses in realisations of non-classical logic scenarios. In this section, we discuss some of these themes in greater depth
with particular reference to the articles contributing to this volume.
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The graph-theoretic model of argumentation framework in [73] and the deductive schema supporting the
assumption-based frameworks of [43] have given rise to an extensive body of research with particular concentration
on the following,
(a) Extension based semantics of argumentation.
(b) Algorithmic and complexity issues in argumentation.
(c) Dialogue processes for deciding acceptability.
Extension-based semantics of argumentation
Each of the extension-based semantics presented in [73] builds on sets of arguments, S, that are conflict-free:
that is, no argument within S attacks another in S. Conflict-freeness, as observed by Baroni and Giacomin [22] in
their study of evaluative criteria for extension semantics, is viewed as a minimal requirement to be satisfied within
any computationally sensible notion of “collection of justified arguments”. Conflict-freeness, however, is too weak a
condition, in itself, to be applied as a reasonable guarantor that a set of arguments S is “collectively acceptable”: for
example, such a set could be attacked by arguments not among its members.
It is in the approaches posited to form additional conditions on (conflict-free) subsets of arguments that complica-
tions become apparent, and out of the divers methods proposed to resolve such complications that the current, to use
Guillermo Simari’s phrase, “plethora of argumentation semantics”9 has emerged.
The three principal extension-based semantics introduced in [73]—the so-called Grounded, Preferred and Stable
semantics—can exhibit a variety of problematic aspects.10
(P1) Emptiness: although an extension satisfying the prescribed conditions always exists, there are AFs for which the
only such extension is the empty set. This can arise with both the grounded and preferred semantics of [73].
(P2) Non-existence: an extension, when it exists is never empty, but there are frameworks for which no extension
meeting the required criteria exists. This can occur, for example, with Dung’s stable semantics.
(P3) Multiplicity: in an AF there may be several “incompatible” extensions, i.e. sets S1 and S2 which are well-defined
extensions of 〈X ,A〉 but with S1 ∪ S2 failing to be so. While Dung’s grounded semantics does not suffer from
this problem, frameworks are easily constructed in which both the preferred and stable semantics exhibit this
phenomenon.
A number of approaches have been proposed in order to address these and other perceived drawbacks. Thus, Cayrol
and Lagasquie-Schiex [55] define concepts of “graduality” in order to evaluate classes of acceptable arguments, Cami-
nada [46] introduces semi-stable semantics; Dung, Mancarella and Toni [75, p. 151] develop ideal semantics and their
paper in this volume [76] presents further analyses concerning the computation of ideal extensions in ABFs. Baroni et
al. [21,23] define various extension-based semantics for an AF building from the strongly-connected component (SCC)
decomposition of its directed graph: of the resulting SCC-recursive semantics, CF2-semantics have been examined in
depth in [23]. In [62], Coste-Marquis, Devred and Marquis consider a refinement of the concept of “conflict-free set”
in order to exclude “controversial arguments” [73, p. 332], i.e. arguments {x, y} such that, although 〈x, y〉 /∈A there
is an “indirect attack” by x on y: the resulting approach gives rise to the prudent semantics of [62].
A number of extension-based semantics have been proposed motivated by new interpretations of the interactions
between arguments that should be considered: thus the basic binary attack relation of [73] is developed. Important
contributions of this type include the articles by Cayrol et al.—[50,53,54]—wherein the relation “the argument x
supports the argument y” is introduced leading to the formulation of bipolar argumentation frameworks. In such
frameworks each of the existing extension semantics can be qualified through bipolarity, e.g. [50] considers bipolar
prudent semantics. Other developments of Dung’s attack structure are offered in work of Nielsen and Parsons [134]
9 During the presentation of [129] at COMMA 2006, 12th September, 2006.
10 It should be noted that although our description is given in terms of AFs exactly the same issues arise in the analogous semantics within ABFs.
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be defined in terms of A⊆ 2X ×X , i.e. each x ∈X has an associated set of subsets of X that attack it.11
A different treatment of A forms the basis of Amgoud and Cayrol’s approach in [7] to the interpretative issues
created by the presence of multiple preferred extensions. In this any AF is augmented by a preference relation over
arguments defining an attack in A. In the resulting preference-based AF (PAF)12 an attack 〈x, y〉 is relevant only if the
argument y is not preferred to the argument x. By imposing suitable restrictions the effect of specifying preferences
within a given AF is to reduce it to an acyclic graph: for such frameworks, [73] has shown that the grounded, preferred,
and stable semantics coincide in a unique extension.
The value-based argumentation frameworks (VAF) of Bench-Capon [27,28] also stem from attempts to provide
a formal basis on which to rationalise choices between several preferred extensions. The basic elements of VAFs
are described in the paper by Dunne [80, Section 8]. In common with the preference-based approach, resolving
choices in VAFs can be interpreted in terms of consistently removing attacks (using “value” orderings) so that the
resulting framework is, again, one in which all three basic extension semantics coincide. The philosophical rationale
underpinning VAFs ultimately derives from Perelman [145] and is treated in more depth in Section 3.3. A detailed
comparative discussion of preference and value-based methods may be found in [30, Section 7.1].
The article by Baroni and Giacomin [22], makes a powerful case for re-examining the proliferation of new seman-
tics:
“In fact, various kinds of motivations have been used to support the introduction of new semantics with respect
to “classical” proposals . . . These motivations range from the desire to formalise some high-level intuition, not
captured by other proposals, to the need to achieve the “correct” treatment of a particular example (or family of
examples) regarded as particularly significant. . . .
Clearly, these kinds of heterogeneous intuitions hardly lend themselves to systematic comparisons. Given this
situation it is not surprising that comparisons are quite often carried out using specific problematic examples,
often ingeniously devised so as to bring to light patently different behaviours exhibited by the semantics under
discussion.” ([22, Intro.])
Extension-based semantics in AFs continues to be an extremely active topic for argumentation models in AI and
a number of specialised technical questions remain unresolved.13 Important as such questions are, it may well be
the case, however, that treatments of extension-based semantics will come to focus less on the construction of novel
specialised forms and more on consolidation theories such as the evaluative principles of [22] or the complementary
approach applied to arguments with a particular structure of [47,48]: just as the attempts to construct a notional
“definitive” non-monotonic logic from the disparate alternatives proposed in the 1980s are now recognised as ill-
fated, such is likely to be the outcome of efforts to build an “ultimate” extension-based semantics.
Algorithmic and complexity issues
While the preponderance of formal theoretical study into computational issues arising from [43,73] has addressed
semantic concerns within these abstract frameworks, there is a significant core of results relating to algorithmics and
computational complexity.
Early work of Dimopoulos and Torres [69] derived exact complexity classifications for a number of decision prob-
lems involving extension-based semantics in AFs14 and a summary of these results may be found in [80, Table 1(a–d)].
In [81], Dunne and Bench-Capon further develop complexity-theoretic analysis of Dung’s model in deriving exact
bounds on the computational complexity of two questions (neither of which is considered in [69]): that of deciding
if a given argument is justified under the most restrictive semantics defined in [73] (so-called sceptical acceptance);
11 For details see the paper by Nielsen and Parsons [135] in this volume.
12 These should not be confused with the partial argumentation frameworks (also denoted PAF) described in the article by Coste-Marquis et al.
[64] in this volume.
13 Among which are issues such as conditions under which particular extension-based semantics coincide, existence properties etc.
14 The analyses of [69] are not presented in the context of Dung’s frameworks from [73] but may be readily translated into this. A discussion of
the links between [69] and [73] may be found in Dunne and Bench-Capon [81, pp. 188–189].
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whereby every set of arguments defining a preferred extension also defines a stable extension.
Both [69] and [81] relate to decision problems in AFs: the basis for hardness results is via suitable directed graph
mechanisms, cf. the two core constructions described in [80, Secn. 3]. In an important series of articles—[66–
68]—Dimopoulos, Nebel and Toni consider analogous questions within various instantiations of assumption-based
frameworks. A significant achievement of this work is in characterising the computational complexity of decision
questions in ABFs with respect to that of testing “derivability” (i.e. of ϕ from a given base ) within the associated
logic modelled by the ABF: derivability being central in determining the existence of attacks between arguments. In
consequence a number of instantiations of ABFs describing particular non-classical logics exhibit a significant increase
in complexity compared with the NP or p2 -completeness of related problems in AFs.
The contributions of [66–69,81] primarily focus on purely complexity-theoretic analyses. Efficient algorithmic
methods are introduced in [73] for special classes of AF (directed acyclic graphs—DAGs) and, more recently, in
work of Coste-Marquis et al. [63] (for symmetric frameworks). The extent to which such graph-theoretic conditions
can ameliorate complexity issues forms the central topic of Dunne’s paper [80] in this volume. The treatment of
“graduality” in [55] includes a number of algorithmic elements and other useful work has emerged from modelling of
argument justification via dialogue games, e.g. [51,52,184].
One collection of methods which have received increasing attention over the past five years concern enumerative
techniques for constructing all extensions (of a particular form) within a given AF, key contributions being the work
of Doutre and Mengin [70] and Verheij’s labelling approach to generating all stable extensions of an AF described
in [181]. More recent work includes algorithms of Nielsen and Parsons [134] and Vreeswijk [183], the first of these
relative to the authors’ set-theoretic notion of attack mentioned earlier. An alternative slant on the question of enumer-
ating preferred sets is offered in [77] which considers the following issue: under the assumption that an enumeration,
S , has already been produced, to what extent can it be represented compactly with the representation allowing S ∈?S
to be decided efficiently for any subset of arguments of S?15 While [77] presents indications that a number of compu-
tational question remain difficult even with significant additional information provided, more positive results indicate
that concise encodings of preferred sets which can be efficiently queried may be possible.16
The algorithmic analysis of ABFs has been rather less advanced than that within AFs: one major factor account-
ing for this is, of course, the formidable complexity-theoretic issues raised in [68]. Nevertheless, promising dialogue
based techniques are presented in work of Dung, Kowalski and Toni [74]. The paper by Dung et al. in this volume [76]
offers a further example of dialogue approaches by adapting these to the computation of ideal extensions in ABFs. In
addition, recent work of Egly and Woltran [88] is of some interest: this proposes approaches building on transla-
tions to quantified Boolean formulae and the subsequent exploitation of highly-tuned QBF solvers to resolve decision
questions.17
The article by Coste-Marquis et al. in this volume [64] introduces an important topic that appears to have been
largely neglected in previous studies: given a number of distinct AFs, describing, say the views of a number of ob-
servers regarding a specific issue, how should these be merged into a “sensible” unified framework that “fairly” reflects
individual viewpoints? The techniques in [64] contribute both to semantic and algorithmic aspects of this question.
For the developments of [73] represented by PAFs and VAFs, only the latter gives rise to non-trivial algorithmic and
complexity issues. Treatments of these, including exact complexity classifications of the principal decision questions
together with algorithmic approaches may be found in the series of papers by Dunne et al. [30,71,83,84]; Dunne’s
paper in this volume indicates that a number of non-trivial issues remain to be resolved in the algorithmic treatment
of VAFs.
Dialogue-based approaches to deciding argument acceptability
The view of reasoning as a dialogue mechanism has been widely adopted in formal algorithmic approaches to
determining the acceptance status of arguments within both AF and ABF models. Such a view has also featured
15 While the AF itself provides a compact encoding of its preferred sets, in view of [69] it is unlikely that this would satisfy the “efficient querying”
criterion.
16 Of course, finding such encodings given an AF is another matter.
17 Treatments of non-classical logic via propositional encoding had also been proposed in earlier work of Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [25]; similar
techniques, for AFs, are discussed in [81, p. 202].
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these techniques include argument line (a chain 〈x0, x1, . . . , xk〉 in which the argument xi attacks the argument xi−1
for i > 0) and the concept of (partial) proof tree, which, in informal terms, can be interpreted as combining a number
of distinct argument lines concerning a common initial argument. In pursuing such approaches a number of basic
questions arise: rules and strategies affecting the selection of arguments with which to continue a dialogue; termination
properties; demonstrating soundness and completeness of procedures intended to establish acceptability of arguments
in particular semantics; approaches to assessing the “efficiency” of dialogue methods, and so on.
The generic formalism for describing dialogue games within Dung’s model of argument introduced in [105] was
discussed, briefly, earlier. A significant subsequent development is found in the methods presented by Vreeswijk and
Prakken in [184]. This describes the structure of Two-part Immediate Response (TPI) disputes. Adopting the two
player PRO and OPP convention for debate over an argument x, among the features of TPI-disputes is the requirement
for each player to attack the most recently played argument of their opponent whenever it is possible (within the
game’s rules) to do so. Several examples in [184] establish that both players require moves allowing back-tracking to
a defined earlier point in a dialogue. The resulting game is shown to be sound and complete for so-called credulous
reasoning, i.e. where the aim is to decide if x is a member of at least one preferred extension. Thus for any AF
and argument x within it, TPI-disputes are guaranteed to terminate and correctly to determine whether x is justified
under Dung’s credulous preferred semantics (PRO wins) or x cannot be so justified (OPP wins). A variant of this game
provides sound and complete methods for sceptical reasoning in coherent AFs i.e. where PRO wins if and only if x
belongs to every preferred extension.
Vreeswijk and Prakken’s results in [184] were instrumental in motivating one of the first systematic studies con-
cerning formal concepts of “efficiency” of dialogue games in argumentation: the definition and analysis of dispute
complexity presented by Dunne and Bench-Capon in [82]. Informally, the dispute complexity of a dialogue game is
measured in terms of the (worst-case) number of moves that might be required in order to resolve the status of a
given argument in an AF. One significant contribution of [82] is its positioning of such dialogue games within an
established body of work regarding the relative efficiency of propositional proof methods via the concept of dispute
complexity, i.e. the basis provided in Cook and Reckhow [61]. Thus, [82] not only demonstrates that TPI-disputes
occasion a propositional proof method but also, adopting the comparative criteria for such systems presented in [61],
further show that the resulting system is equivalent to the CUT-free sequent calculus of Gentzen [92]. In consequence,
via results of Urquhart [180], one may construct (a family of) AFs and arguments within these—〈AFn,ϕ〉 such that
resolving the status of ϕ requires exponentially long TPI-disputes.
Important treatments combining elements of MacKenzie’s dialogue model [121] with the formal approach of
[105]—for example, locutions, utterances, rules for dialogue continuation, termination—are found in McBurney, Par-
sons, and others, e.g. [106,122–124,141,142]. Much of the emphasis of this work is directed towards providing a basis
for dialogue exploitation in multi-agent system contexts—for example Torroni’s analysis of termination properties in
negotiation dialogues [177]—as discussed in Section 3.2.
Treatments of proof-theoretic techniques via dialogue methods using the concepts of argumentation line and partial
proof-tree have been considered in a number of recent papers. An important issue in this context concerns the design of
heuristics that reduce the search space thereby obviating the requirement to consider all expansions of each argument
line. Dung, Kowalski and Toni [74] propose a novel “backward reasoning” approach to the construction of proof-
trees in ABFs. Recent work of Chesnevar and Simari [58] deals with sceptical argumentation via a lattice-theoretic
encoding of the relevant search space. A related question in implementing dialogue mechanisms is that of deciding
which (from a range of available options) is the “best” continuation for a participant to contribute. There are, of
course, many interpretations of “best” that may be applicable from loosely defined intuitive qualitative notions (e.g.
most “persuasive” or “convincing”) to quantitative ideas, e.g. guaranteed to terminate debate in the fewest possible
moves. In [86,87] Dunne and McBurney consider one formalisation of this problem that allows it to be related to the
“literal selection” problem examined by Liberatore [112].
A final collection of issues, concerning which computational treatment has only recently been initiated, addresses
questions arising from wider considerations of the motives of participants. Thus, recognising that contributors to a
discussion may have rational bases to obstruct its development or be anxious to avoid revealing information regard-
ing their pursuit of an issue. In [91], Gabbay and Woods examine the use of so-called “stone-walling” tactics as one
means of impeding the progress of information-seeking dialogues, while Dunne [78] considers settings in which one
participant seeks to prolong discussion and reviews such approaches against a variety of legal applications. Informa-
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Paruchiri et. al [144]. A very preliminary study of computational elements relating to the concept of “hidden agenda”18
is initiated in [79].
3.2. Exploiting argumentation techniques in multi-agent systems
If the significant interests moving argumentation into AI during the 1980s and early 1990s were driven by its appli-
cation to non-classical logics, within the last 10 years argumentation technology has increasingly been widely adopted
in driving the development of another computational field, also of importance in AI: the paradigm of autonomous agent
computing, e.g. as described in Sycara [176], Wooldridge [192].
It is not difficult to account for this interest, the basis for which lies in the key paper of Sycara [175] in which a
system for multi-agent negotiation—PERSUADER—is described: negotiation in [175] being presented and treated as
a persuasive argumentation process. Automated negotiation mechanisms have long formed a central concern of work
in multi-agent systems and the article by Ramchurn et al. [159] in this volume marks a further development of this
field. We refer the reader to [159, Section 7] for a more detailed discussion of subsequent work building on [175] in
particular the important contributions of Kraus, Sycara and Evenchik [110] and Parsons, Sierra and Jennings [140].
A number of important themes have emerged from such treatments of inter-agent negotiation as an argumentation
driven persuasive dialogue: the rationalisation of individual agent contributions as stages in a goal-directed plan; the
study of logic-based language formalisms in terms of both syntactic (e.g. the manner in which agents represent con-
tributions to debate, proposals, goals they seek to bring about, etc.) and semantic (e.g. how an agent’s perspectives
are affected by particular contributions as negotiation progresses) aspects; the development and analysis of formal
agent oriented dialogue games; the consideration of comparative criteria for differentiating and classifying dialogue
mechanisms, etc. As should be evident from the brief survey presented in Section 2.2 such themes interact heavily
with the core body of philosophical and rhetorical theories of dialogue, most notably in the contributions of MacKen-
zie [121] and Walton and Krabbe [189]. Treatments of such topics forms the object of study in work of Parsons et al.
[141–143], Amgoud et al. [8], McBurney et al. [125,126]. A collection of recent articles on the theme of inter-agent
communication languages may be found in Dignum [65].
One further feature of argumentation has been influential in encouraging its adoption as an enabling technology for
multi-agent systems developments. A central idea advanced in agent-based approaches is that of autonomy: agents act
as individual entities, often, but not always, attempting to cooperate and coordinate with others. In such environments,
however, the actions that an individual agent wishes to perform may conflict with the actions attempted by other agents,
e.g. in seeking access to particular limited resources. An agent’s understanding and knowledge of its environment (and
of its awareness of the perspective of other agents) is likely to be incomplete and uncertain, thereby subject to continual
revision. These elements of incomplete knowledge, uncertain information, and the potential for conclusions initially
formed subsequently to be rejected are, as we have seen, fundamental to the nature of argumentation. In sum multi-
agent applications provide a natural arena for formalisms building on the study of argumentation directed towards
justifying actions (as opposed to beliefs) as the mechanism by which an agent seeks to bring about particular desired
goals—that is, the study of so-called practical reasoning which we review in the next section. Argumentation as an
approach for autonomous agents to make decisions is discussed in work of Kakas and Moraitis [109] and the paper by
Oren et al. [137] in this volume deals with important aspects regarding reaching agreement in the presence of uncertain
(and potentially unreliable) evidence. Observing that individual agents seeking to come to a shared understanding
about aspects of their environment require methods by which conflicting evidence concerning this may be assessed
and resolved, [137] discuss those factors which must be considered and present a solution approach whose logical
framework builds on Josang’s Subjective Logic [107].
3.3. Practical reasoning
Arguments are often thought of a set of reasons for a claim, and the claim is typically thought of as being propo-
sitional, that such and such is the case. Many arguments are, however, not about whether some belief is true, but
18 The term “hidden agenda” is attributed to Barsky [24] by Silverman [172].
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and negotiation can concern what should be done in a given situation, rather than what is true. Reasoning about what
should be done has been seen as a specific topic in Philosophy since the time of Aristotle, and is there termed practical
reasoning. For a collection of philosophical essays on the topic, see [160].
Practical reasoning has a number of important differences from theoretical reasoning. There may be many ways
to achieve a given goal, and so sufficiency of an action to achieve a goal is not enough—it needs to be the best
way. Side effects—both beneficial and harmful—need to be considered. Also—and this is an important distinction
between practical reasoning and traditional planning systems—it cannot simply be taken as given that the goal itself is
worth achieving, or that it should be pursued at the expense of other goals which might be adopted instead. Practical
reasoning involves the selection of goals as well as their realisation.
Important too is the notion of direction of fit [171]. In theoretical reasoning agents are trying to make their beliefs
fit the world and, since reality is thought to be the same for all, perfectly rational agents with complete information
should be able to come to agreement. When there is disagreement, one agent will be right and the other will be wrong.
In contrast, practical reasoning attempts to make the world fit what the agent wants it to be, the point of actions
being to change the state of the world so that it is some respects more acceptable to the agent. Different agents may
quite properly have different interests and aspirations, and so, even if perfectly rational and in possession of complete
information, they may disagree as to what it is best to do. In practical reasoning there is no implication that one is
right and one is wrong: each may be right, according to their own perspective.
Representation of such individual perspectives has been built on the notion of “audience” introduced by Perelman
[145]. Perelman stressed that the purpose of an argument is to persuade, and whether an argument succeeds in per-
suading is a function not only of the argument itself but also of the audience to which it is being addressed. It is those
hearing the argument that are important in this respect, not the speaker. For example, an argument to cut top rates
of tax because it will enable high earners to keep more of their income might persuade captains of industry while
leaving their work force entirely unmoved. To convince the latter an argument in terms of increased general prosperity
in which all will share must be made. Perelman’s notion of audience has been used in AI in work such as [98] and
[27]. Although it is particularly important in the context of practical reasoning, Perelman would argue that the notion
of audience is important for all arguments, theoretical and practical. In the context of theoretical reasoning, different
assumptions and reasoning capabilities may affect the acceptance of an argument. For an exploration of the notion of
audiences with respect to theoretical reasoning, see [102] and [103].
Issues relating to practical reasoning have received far less attention than theoretical reasoning, but have become
increasingly important as autonomous agents grow in popularity. The autonomy of agents requires them to be able
to select, at least to some extent, the goals they will pursue: it is not enough that they find ways to satisfy goals
given from outside, or built in at design time. One approach, advocated by Amgoud and Rahwan [157], uses a set
of beliefs together with a base of desire rules to produce arguments for which desires to adopt, and then a set of
planning rules to determine how to fulfil these desires given the beliefs. Huljstein and van der Torre [101] have
also provided a framework for combining goal generation and planning. An alternative approach, represented by the
paper by Atkinson and Bench-Capon in this volume [19], uses an ordered set of values to represent the interests and
the aspirations of an agent, differences in agents being represented by differences in the value ordering. This value
ordering is found to produce arguments by instantiating an argument scheme for practical reasoning [20], goals being
selected by reason of their enhancement of some favoured value.
Autonomous agents, by their very nature need to select actions, and perhaps to justify them to others and to persuade
and negotiate joint actions with other agents. Of course, theoretical reasoning is an important part of this, since an
accurate understanding of the state of the world and the effects of their actions is essential. Practical reasoning is,
however, also vitally important if this knowledge of the world is to be put to good use.
3.4. Informal logic: Argument diagrams and schemes
The arguments we typically encounter, both in the everyday contexts of newspaper editorials, and in scholarly
contexts such as philosophical writing, are presented in a rather discursive manner. Examples are accumulated, prin-
ciples stated, objections raised and countered, and claims made. Understanding such arguments is often helped by an
analysis which attempts to establish the components of the argument and the relations between them. Once the claim
has been precisely formulated, and the various supporting material identified it becomes much easier to see exactly
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identified, and often subtle shifts of meaning will be uncovered. The analysis of arguments in this way has long been
the stock in trade of philosophers and critics, but over the last twenty-five to thirty years the study of methods to re-
formulate arguments has developed into the discipline of informal logic, given considerable impetus by the increasing
importance given to the teaching of critical thinking, especially in the United States. There are now many textbooks
devoted to this topic, of which [191] and [168] may serve as examples.
Although many of the analyses of arguments are expressed in natural language, there is also a tradition of using
diagrams to explicate the relations between the components of the arguments. Early examples are Wigmore [190], who
used diagrams to represent the elements of legal cases, and Toulmin [178] who made use of a simple diagrammatic
structure to promote thinking about arguments critically.
Whether analysed using text or diagrams, it is a striking feature that the supporting statements produced from the
analysis often do not seem to entail the claim. On one view, deductivism, such arguments are claimed to be elliptical,
with some premises that are hidden. This view leads its exponents to reconstruct such arguments, by treating the
assumptions as implicit premises which when added yield a deductive argument. This view underlies a good deal of
thinking about argument in AI: it is perhaps the standard approach to define an argument as a sequence of inference
steps, either in a classical or a non-monotonic logic (see e.g. [47] for a recent definition of argument in these terms).
In informal logic, however, deductivism is not universally accepted, on the grounds that such a restrictive model fails
to do justice to the richness and variety of arguments found in natural language. As will be discussed below, the view
that not all arguments can be reconstructed as deductive arguments has also received attention in AI.
An important tool in early informal logic was the study of fallacies as discussed in Section 2.2—patterns of poor
reasoning which somehow mimic good reasoning—and a number of patterns of fallacious reasoning were identified.
There is, however, another side to this: some of these patterns do indeed seem to present instances of good reasoning.
The stereotypical patterns of good reasoning are often termed argument schemes. Consider “if p then q , and q , so p”.
At one level this is simply fallacious, the fallacy of affirming the antecedent. Often, however, this pattern is used to
express a perfectly good argument based on “inference to the best explanation”. Of course, to be a good argument,
not only does the antecedent have to be an explanation of the consequent, but all other potential explanations of the
consequent have to be considered, and this particular antecedent chosen as the best explanation.
The deductivist approach would be to enumerate all explanations, and demonstrate the falsity of all explanations
other than the favoured one.19 It is, however, often impractical to enumerate all the explanations, and even more so to
eliminate all the alternative explanations. Instead it is possible to give a more procedural account in terms of argument
schemes, e.g. [186]. Here the instantiation of an argument scheme such as “inference to the best explanation” gives a
presumptive justification for the conclusion. The argument scheme is, however, subject to a number of critical ques-
tions characteristic of the scheme, such as, for inference to the best explanation, is there an alternative explanation?,
which challenge this presumption. On this view, the presumptive conclusion will stand unless some alternative expla-
nation is produced. Should such an alternative explanation be produced, the presumption can be defended by showing
it to be false, or at least inferior to the original explanation. This has great appeal for modelling reasoning against
a background of incomplete information and limited resources, both of which are common in AI. The conclusion is
justified not by demonstration, but by withstanding the appropriate critical procedure in the particular circumstances.
This then leads to the consideration of what argument schemes should be accepted, and what critical questions are
associated with them. Ref. [186] lists more than twenty schemes, but the list is extensible. Another set of argument
schemes can be found in [145].
In recent years, there has been important cross fertilisation between informal logic and computer science. The
practise of argument diagramming is an area which can be effectively supported with computer tools, providing com-
puter support, and argument diagrams offer an attractive way of presenting the fruits of automatic reasoning. During
the 1990s, one main focus was on Toulmin’s diagrammatic argument scheme: [128] and [120] provide two early ex-
amples. Another very influential tool, not based on Toulmin, was gIBIS [60]. A more general tool in current use is
Araucaria [162]. Araucaria gives a general way of building up argument diagrams, includes facilities for representing
argument schemes, and allows for the translation between the original diagrams of Araucaria and diagrams in the
19 It is often said that the great fictional detective Sherlock Homes is wrongly called the “Master of Deduction” since he explains his method
as “when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”, which is abduction. It is, however, a
deductivist interpretation of abduction.
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tools, such as Claimaker and Compendium developed at the Knowledge Media Institute of the Open University were
intended to give an overview of an entire body of thought across a number of authors, such as the Turing machine
intelligence debate (e.g. [111,179]).
The advance of the World Wide Web also made the vision of an on-line resource of modelled arguments being
available to all, and of this resource being made extensible in the manner of Wikipedia. For an example of the tra-
ditional textual modelling of the arguments of Aristotle and Plato see the Archelogos Project of Scaltsas [11]; with
respect to diagrams, many of the other tools mentioned above are also available to be used over the Web. As this vision
spreads there has been an attempt to bring together various strands of this work and to produce a standard for repre-
senting and exchanging arguments. This has resulted in the Argument Interchange Format (AIF) [56]. A development
of AIF designed to enable the provision of a large corpus of represented arguments on-line is the topic of the paper by
Rahwan et al. [158] in this volume.
There has been an increasing interchange between informal logicians and argumentation people in computer sci-
ence, and a number of interdisciplinary events have been organised, fostering collaboration, e.g. [161]. From these
collaborations interest in argumentation schemes has flourished. The notion of presumptive arguments as the instanti-
ation of argument schemes subject to critical questioning has particularly influenced two of the papers in this volume:
Gordon et al. [97], emphasise the procedural nature of justification using a generalised argument scheme while Atkin-
son and Bench-Capon [19] offer a detailed exploration of a particular argument scheme and its critical questions.
3.5. Specialist domains and applications
There are a number of particular disciplines in which argumentation is central, and which have particular styles of
argument associated with them. One such area which has been the subject of a good deal of argumentation related
AI research is Law (see [166] for a survey of AI and Law research, and for overviews of argumentation in AI and
Law see [33,34]). Argumentation is particularly important in law: a legal case typically centres on a conflict between
two parties which is resolved by each side producing arguments in an effort to persuade the judge that their side is
right. The judge then decides which party to favour, and publishes a decision in which he argues why his decision is
justified. Modelling legal reasoning can then be seen, to a large extent, in terms of modelling argument, and so it is
unsurprising that attempts to understand legal argumentation have been a key strand in AI and Law.
One of the earliest AI and Law projects was the Taxman project of Thorne McCarty ([127] provides a good
summary). The idea there was to model the argument of the majority and minority opinions of the Supreme Court
decision in a famous tax case, Eisner vs Macomber, which had centred on whether a particular share issue was income
or not. That case is quite representative of legal argument: there are things to be said on both sides, and the verdict was
in doubt and—as the existence of a minority decision testifies—it is even possible to justify finding for either party.
In the 1980s argumentation in law was pursued by the influential HYPO project of Rissland and Ashley [14],
which modelled arguing with cases in the field of US Trade Secrets Law. Important features of this system were the
modelling of adversarial argument as a three ply structure, where a case is first cited, then contested by the other
party, before finally the original party is allowed a chance to rebut, and the modelling of facts as dimensions so as
to allow for hypothetical cases to be created by strengthening or weakening cases in particular respects. This work
broke into two strands, CABERET [174], which identified a set of argument moves and strategies, and CATO [3],
which was designed to teach the HYPO style of reasoning with cases to law students. Another important paper in this
tradition was [119], which extended the notion of argument moves to include the restatement of positions to uncover
the rationale underlying the position, the better to identify the point at which to attack it.
This work, predominately from the US, concentrated on cases and arguments based on precedent cases. In Europe
the focus had rather been on the representation of law, particularly statute law, as rules. A key problem with such
representations was that the rules were often conflicting, and of uncertain application because they contained open
textured terms. Although argumentation had long been suggested as an approach to resolving open texture [35], it
was not until [73] offered a way of approaching conflict, defeasibility and reinstatement in terms of argumentation
frameworks that argument became accepted as central to rule based approaches. Prakken, e.g. [153], was particularly
influential in promoting the idea that the conflicting arguments generated from the rule based representation should
be evaluated by being organised into a Dung-style argumentation framework in order to resolve conflict. Once argu-
mentation had become appreciated by the rule based exponents of AI and Law, the divide between rule based and case
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HYPO style reasoning in rule based terms, such as [156].
Another important theme relevant to argumentation in AI and Law relates to modelling legal reasoning as a dia-
logue game. This approach was introduced into AI and Law by Gordon’s Pleadings Game [96], which modelled the
pre-trial process of pleading, designed to identify which aspects of a case were agreed and which were disputed. The
key element here was that dialogue was used to model the process of a legal dispute, appealing to the notion of proce-
dural justice, whereby a decision derives its validity from being the output of a properly conducted procedure. There
followed a number of legally directed dialogue games, such as [26,113,114,181]. The emphasis on argumentation as
a dialectical process is reflected in the papers by Gordon et al. [97] and Artikis et al. [13] in this volume. Another
important domain in which argumentation has been applied is that of medicine and one early demonstration of its
effectiveness in this context is provided in work of Fox et al. [90]. The paper by Mozina et al. [132] in this volume
describes the use of argumentation to enhance a Machine Learning technique also relates to medicine, but an earlier
application applied the same technique in the legal domain [133].
This brief discussion of argumentation in AI and Law shows it to be good example of how developments in
argumentation techniques, such as case based techniques, dialogue and the argumentation frameworks of Dung, have
been absorbed into a particular area of application, and developed within it, driven by particular problems and needs
arising from that domain. These developments have then fed back into argumentation generally. Although none of
the papers in this volume are specifically directed to law, several of the authors are stalwarts of that field (Sergot,
Bench-Capon, Gordon and Prakken have all been Programme Chairs of the biennial International Conference on AI
and Law, and many of the other authors have also published in AI and Law).
3.6. Other important trends
The themes discussed over the preceding sections reflect the principal trends of interest to the articles contributing
to this volume. It would be inappropriate, however, to regard these as defining the entire scope of argumentation in
AI. For this reason we now very briefly outline a select number of areas which, although not explicitly considered in
subsequent articles, merit some discussion. Considerations of space prevent a more detailed analysis of these fields
and interested readers are directed to the references indicated and their associated bibliographies for more extensive
treatments.
A formal model of argumentation with some features in common with both AF and ABF methods is found in
Deductive Argument Frameworks. These model an argument for a claim p as a pair 〈S,p〉 wherein S is a collection
of (propositional) formulae (called the support) drawn from a knowledge-base  and whose collective acceptance
(logically) entails the conclusion p. The usual concept of “attack” that is adopted is that of the conclusion of one
argument being inconsistent with the support for another. Treatments of argumentation using this model are provided
in a series of papers by Besnard and Hunter [39,40,102,103]; the relationship between deductive frameworks and AFs
is examined in a recent paper of Wooldridge et al. [193]. A number of current issues within this model are the subject
of Hunter’s Argumentation Factory project [15].
The fact that information used in argumentation is often uncertain suggests probability theory as a natural analytic
approach to adopt. In consequence a number of models of probabilistic argumentation have been put forward. The
series of papers by Benferhat, Dubois, and Prade [36–38] and the, more recent, analyses of Amgoud and Prade [6,9,
10] provide excellent exemplars of such methods. Other related work builds on concepts of possibilistic logic and has
been developed in recent papers of Alsinet et al. [1,2].
Treatments of natural language and argumentation date back to the foundational work of Birnbaum et al. [42] and
Alvarado and Dyer [4,5]. An important recent trend in natural language studies has been in the direction of generating
natural language arguments rather than the interpretative analysis that underpins earlier work. The articles by Green
and Carberry [99], Walker et al. [185] and Carenini and Moore [49] provide a good overview of these recent trends in
natural language approaches to argumentation.
We conclude this short summary by noting one area of activity which is only just beginning to be developed in the
study of argumentation in AI. In our analysis of Dung’s work [73], one aspect of this which was not considered is—as
emphasised in the title of [73]—its relationship with classical game-theory as pioneered by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [136]. The question of how extension-based semantics in AFs relate to classical concepts of solutions within
n-player games, e.g. as described in Osborne and Rubinstein [138]—has been reviewed in work of Rombouts [163].
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to) the well-established theory of debate in game-theoretic economic models. A typical and accessible treatment of
argumentation in such models is provided in Glazer and Rubinstein [94].
4. Summary
As we have seen, argumentation covers a wide range of approaches and concerns, and has drawn on influences
from a number of sources. In this volume we have selected from the substantial number of good quality submissions
a set of papers intended to reflect this diversity both of approach and concern.
Several of the papers build on abstract argumentation frameworks as introduced by Dung. Central to these argumen-
tation based frameworks, are extension based semantics, but a number of competing semantics have been proposed.
The paper by Dung et al. considers one such alternative—the ideal semantics—an underlying motivation of which
is to provide an extension-based form that relaxes the extreme sceptical requirements of Dung’s grounded semantics
while being less credulous than admissibility semantics. The paper by Baroni and Giacomin attempts to bring some
principle and order to the treatment of extension-based semantics by proposing a number of criteria by which such
semantics can be evaluated, and applying these criteria to a representative range of existing proposals. This system-
atic exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of the various different semantics provides an excellent overview of
what has been proposed and the issues at stake. The need to identify extensions of various types in argumentation
frameworks in order to evaluate the status of the arguments within them gives rise to a number of decision problems,
several of which have been shown to be computationally intractable, although efficient decision procedures may ex-
ist if certain restrictions are imposed. Argumentation frameworks are naturally represented as graphs, and the paper
by Dunne examines the complexity properties of argument frameworks which are subject to certain graph theoretic
restrictions. These restrictions are shown to have positive results for some decision problems, although others remain
intractable. Most work on argumentation frameworks has investigated a single structure. In many applications, how-
ever, argumentation frameworks may be developed independently. If several such frameworks are developed, there
may be arguments that are included in some but not all, and there may be disagreement with respect to the attack
relation. In order for the different perspectives to be pooled, the various frameworks need to be merged, and the
differences between them reconciled to achieve some kind of consensus. The paper by Coste-Marquis et al. investi-
gates issues relating the merging of Dung-style frameworks. They show that simple voting is not adequate, and offer
a general framework in which the frameworks can be merged in a principled manner. The problem of extracting a
consensus from a group of agents with different perspectives is also the topic of the paper by Nielsen and Parsons. In
their treatment, however, each agent is equipped with a Bayesian network, and their approach is to provide an open
framework in which the agents can use argumentation to arrive at an agreed network. In their framework the agents
can, in a distributed fashion, explore the consequences of various compromises, and so judge which are acceptable.
Dialogues, especially dialogues between agents, are an important way of exploiting argumentation in systems.
In order for agents to engage in dialogue there must be some protocol which both parties will follow in order to
make sense of the exchanges. The paper by Artikis et al. gives an example of this work by providing a specification
in the action language C+ [93] of a protocol based on a formal procedure for dispute resolution. This takes into
account the physical capabilities of the agents concerned, the rules of the protocol itself, and importantly the normative
consequences of these rules for the agents, the sanctions they incur for non-compliance, and the enforcement of
these sanctions. In the context of agents, negotiation has been an important area in which argumentation techniques
have been applied. In a multi-agent system, negotiation may have social aspects, in that a negotiation may often be
part of a series of encounters. In addition to presenting a framework for argumentation based negotiation, the paper
by Ramchurn et al. investigates the effect on negotiation of the opportunity to make promises offering rewards in
future negotiations in return for concessions in the current negotiation. Their theoretical approach is reinforced by an
empirical study which shows that this can improve both the efficiency of the negotiation and the utility of the deals.
Another important feature of agents is that they take in information from their environment and need to form and
adjust their beliefs on the basis of this evidence. Reasoning with evidence is the subject of the paper by Oren et al.
who provide a framework for arguing about evidence based on Subjective Logic which allows for important factors
such as accrual of evidence and burden of proof to be taken into account. The work is set in a dialogical context in
which different agents may have different utilities associated with particular facts being accepted.
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use of several schemes appropriate to evidential reasoning. The paper by Atkinson and Bench-Capon provides an in-
depth exploration of a single argument scheme, designed to justify choices about what should be done in particular
situations. Of prime importance here is the notion of critical questions, the means by which the presumption given by
the instantiation of the scheme can be challenged, and the mechanisms by which the subjective aspects of choice can be
captured by taking into account the individual interests and aspirations of the agent making the choice. The notion of
arguments schemes is also central to the paper of Gordon et al. which provides a general framework in which argument
schemes and their associated critical questions can be represented. The framework emphasises the procedural nature
of argumentation, the burdens of presentation and persuasion placed on those engaged in argumentation and the
standards of proof required to discharge them, all of which are required to ascertain the dialectical status of the claims
being advanced.
Also drawing inspiration from work on informal logic, the paper by Rahwan et al. describes a vision of a world
wide web of argumentation, which can act as an extensible repository of represented arguments. Based on a pro-
posed standard for argument interchange, they describe an open platform for representing arguments, and for building
interlinked and dynamic argument networks to form a publicly available resource.
The final paper, by Mozina et al., presents an interesting example of how argumentation can be used to give a novel
take on a traditional problem. They show how argumentation can be applied in Machine Learning by using arguments
from an expert to guide the learning of concepts using an adapted rule induction algorithm. Argumentation is able
both to improve efficiency by focusing search, and to improve the quality of the rules induced by making them closer
to the terms in which they would be expressed by the expert.
Computational treatments of argumentation with reference to AI are now the subject of a number of well-
established meetings, e.g. ArgMAS within the workshop programme of AAMAS, Computational Models of Natural
Argument (CMNA) alternating between ECAI and IJCAI; a biennial conference (COMMA) [59] was inaugurated in
2006 and is intended to complement these workshops. Also of interest are the number of large-scale argumentation
related research projects which are currently in progress. Among such are ASPIC [16] addressing issues arising in the
provision of argumentation services and ARGUGRID [12] aiming to exploit argumentation technology as a foundation
for Semantic Grid applications.
The contributions to this volume show the range of work currently being produced in argumentation in AI and we
hope that these will encourage specialists from AI fields where such ideas have yet fully to be exploited to consider
what argumentation techniques may have to offer them. From the diversity of contributions and their background
as outlined within this introduction, a number of points are evident: that argumentation in AI now informs the de-
velopment of many, historically core, AI topics; and that the computational treatment of argumentation has evolved
from the abstract models pioneered in [43,73], through methodologies offering effective realisations of argumenta-
tion techniques, to practical implementations directed at concrete applications. Most significantly, however, that the
body of theory, techniques, and applications we have discussed is very far from encompassing a final, definitive de-
scription of the scope and limits of what argumentation-based approaches can offer to the furtherance of AI as a
scientific discipline: many questions remain unresolved, many avenues unexplored, and many applications offer a
wealth of possibilities for future work. When people participate in reasoned debate they are engaging in argumenta-
tion not demonstration. Thus argumentation, rather than logical demonstration, should be seen as the core technique
for justifying claims.
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